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I
CONSTITUTIONAL law has its roots so deeply imbedded in the past
that it is impossible to consider the delicate and intricate adjust-
ments which have resulted therefrom and with which some of the fore-
most issues of national politics are now concerned without reference
to some of the steps in its continuous growth. Citations in recent opin-
ions of the views of Hamilton, Madison, Monroe and Story refer again to
the fundamental divergences of opinion in early American constitutional
interpretation.' Jefferson, who attached little in the way of special sanct-
ity to rules formulated in written parchments, favored a generous use of
the power of amendment and a thorough revision of the constitution for
each generation. Once drafted and formally enacted, however, it was
Jefferson's view that the constitution's terms and conditions should be
strictly and literally followed until necessary and desirable changes could
be secured through amendments. Hamilton, on the other hand, who
would have preferred to have government operate without written re-
strictions, when called upon to interpret such restrictions favored a
loose or latitudinarian interpretation of national authority to be attained
in large part through a doctrine of implied or resulting powers.2 Had
Hamilton's wish been followed, the federal government would have been
granted extensive powers to regulate matters in the interest of the
general welfare. When the Convention failed to adopt his plan, Hamil-
ton suggested a way of accomplishing the same result through the spend-
ing power of Congress. Commenting, in his report to Congress on
manufactures, on the grant of authority to Congress to lay and collect
taxes with only a few express limitations, he contended that
"the power to raise money is plenary and indefinite, and the objects to
which it may be appropriated are no less comprehensive than the payment
of the public debts, and the providing for the common defence and general
welfare .... There seems to be no room for 'a doubt, that whatever con-
cerns the general interests of learning, of agriculture, of manufactures, and
of commerce, are within the sphere of the national councils, as far as re-
gards an application of money."3
t Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. See especially opinion of Justice Roberts in United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct.
312 (1936), and dissenting opinions of Justice McReynolds in Norman v. B. & 0. Rr. Co,,
294 U. S. 240 (1935), and Justice Sutherland in Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blals-
dell, 290 U. S. 298 (1934).
2. HI THE WORKS oF AL xANmER H mToN (Lodge ed. 1885-86) 458.
3. IV Id. at 151, 152.
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Madison took i~sue both with Hamilton's doctrine of implied powers
and his extensive application of the idea of national control over matters
of general interest. Instead, Madison formulated a theory of federalism
whereby "different parts of the same instrument ought to be so ex-
pounded as to give meaning to every part," and insisted that the more
doubtful and indefinite terms of the written charter, such as the general
welfare clause could not be so interpreted and expanded that the clear
and precise expressions in the grants of power to Congress would be
denied any real significance.4 Thus, Jefferson and Madison insisted
that, to maintain the federal balance the position of the states, as well
as that of the federal government, must be preserved. The general
welfare clause or the phrases approved in the Convention authorizing
federal control of national interests or of affairs wherein the states were
separately incompetent were thus held to be limited to mere interpreta-
tion or enlargement of the grants of power expressly allotted to the
federal government by the Constitution.
As is well known, the procedure outlined by Thomas Jefferson was not
approved. Instead, Congress and the Supreme Court, particularly under
the leadership and direction of Chief Justice Marshall, adopted the
Hamiltonian method of expanding federal authority through the medium
of a doctrine of implied powers. Though the principle that the Con-
stitution established a dual system of government, with state and federal
powers delicately balanced as Madison insisted, was frequently reiter-
ated, it came gradually to be assumed that if a power normally belonged
to a sovereign government, and if it was desirable for the purpose of
taking care of the political or economic needs of the nation during an
emergency, the necessary authority for federal exercise of the power
could be found among the ends expressly granted to the federal govern-
ment in the Constitution and the means which might be deemed ap-
propriate to carry such powers into effect.5
With the Civil War confirming the supremacy of the federal govern-
ment by force of arms, the Supreme Court in the Legal Tender Decisions
adopted outright the Hamiltonian-Marshall principle that in accomplish-
ing the ends granted to the federal government in the Constitution a
"national government with sovereign powers" was created and that it
was possible to use any means which Congress might deem appropriate
4. TnE FanRzAisr (1898), No. XLI, and X Tim WhrX:ncs or J, xs ALDio:. (Hunt
Ed. 1910), 411ff.
5. For cases containing expressions of this view, see American Insurance Co. v. Canter,
1 Pet. 511, 541 (U. S. 1828); Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457, 529ff. (U. S. 1870); Kohl
v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 371 (1875); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr. Co., 294 U.
S. 240 (1935). In the light of the prevailing point of view in a variety of cases, Justice
Holmes observed in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 433 (1920) that "it is not lightly
to be assumed that in matters Tequiring national action, a power which must belong t,
and somewhere reside in every civilized govercnment, is not to be found."
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provided that the particular power was not expressly prohibited.0 In
other words, instead of following the precept of the Tenth Amendment,
which Jefferson regarded as fundamental, namely, that all powers not
granted to the federal government are reserved to the states or to the
people, it was assumed that, if occasion demanded, the federal govern-
ment might in connection with its rather extensive grant of powers
exercise any authority it desired, limited only by the few express prohibi-
tions found in the Constitution. This line of reasoning, adopted on
important occasions both by Congress and by the Supreme Court, was
carried to its logical conclusion in the dictum of President Theodore
Roosevelt and Senator Elihu Root to the effect that, if any, field could
advantageously and appropriately be regulated by the federal govern-
ment, such authority should be assumed and supported by the necessary
interpretations and constructions of the Constitution.7 President Roose-
velt frankly stated that he approved the assumption that it was his duty
to do what the general welfare of the country required, and that, in
doing so, he was limited only by the express prohibitions on the exercise
of federal powers.'
The failure to accept the Jeffersonian principle calling for rather
literal interpretation of the written fundamental law and its regular and
systematic amendment to meet the changing conditions and needs of the
country had serious and largely unforeseen consequences on the growth
of constitutional law. A type of constitutional exegesis or legal theology
developed, which has been one of the chief features of American political
life. Events have verified Viscount Bryce's comment that a written
fundamental law which does not provide adequately for its growth from
within must grow or secure its flexibility from without. Hence the
policy of interpreting the words of the Constitution to secure certain
political ends, of discovering "latent and unsuspected meanings" from
its sphinx-like terminology, of giving expression to the silences of the
Constitution, or of the application of the Alice-in-Wonderland device of
having words mean one thing today and another tomorrow. But the
theory and practice which gave encouragement and sanction to the
6. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 404407 (U. S. 1816); Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall.
457 (U. S. 1871); juillard v. Greenman, 110 U. S. 421 (1884). "If it is an appropriate
means" . . . said Chief Justice Hughes, "the decisions of the Congress as to the degree
of necessity for the adoption of that means, is final." Norman v. B. & 0. Rr. Co., 294 U.
S. 240, 311 (1935).
7. "Federal governmental power should be increased through executive action . . .
and through judicial interpretation and construction of law." From address of President
Theodore Roosevelt at Harrisburg, Pa., October 4, 1906. "Sooner or later constructions of
the Constitution will be found to vest additional power in the national government," from
address of Elihu Root before Pennsylvania Society in New York, December 12, 1906.
8. Opinion quoted in WImum HOWARD TAFr, TnE PRESIDENCY: ITS DumS, ITS PowESw,
ITs OpPoaTuNnras, Ais ITs LIuITATIONS (1916) 125, 126.
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justices for the expansion of federal powers by interpretation, also pre-
dicated a basis for the restriction of these powers by a doctrine of im-
plied limitations. Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story indicated
the possibilities in the way of checking the exercise of national powers
through implied limitations9 but no attempt was made to apply such
limitations until the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Supreme
Court justices have, therefore, not only become adept in warping legal
terms to secure results desirable in their view of public policy, but they
have also acquired a rather disturbing facility in discovering limitations
on legislative and executive powers in the general and indefinite phrases
to be found in the Constitution.
I
It was the adoption of the practice of the review of legislation by the
courts, however, which, when coupled with the Hamiltonian method
of changing the document by interpretation, gave to constitutional
exegesis its peculiar American stamp and developed the express and
implied limitations of the Constitution. In making such limitations
effective, judicial review has changed its base from its original mooring
as a jurisdictional equilibrator in the application of the theory of the
separation of powers and in the adjustment of federal relations, to that
of the guardian of the fundamental ideas and premises of conservatism
in political and economic affairs. European commentators familiar with
the evolution of American constitutional law, such as Professor Edouard
Lambert of the University of Lyon have regarded the change of judicial
review from a jurisdictional function in the maintenance of the balance
of powers among the departments and between state and federal author-
ities to a form of censorship over the wisdom or expediency of legislative
or administrative action both of state and federal officers, particularly
with reference to the regulation of social and economic affairs, as a
movement of major importance in the course of American constitutional
interpretation.' This change, accomplished by reading new meaning
and content into phrases such as due process of law and equal protection
of the laws, by reviving and giving more extensive scope to the theory of
separation of powers, and when the specific or general language of the
written constitution was lacking, by falling back on the spirit of written
9. See Marshall's opinion in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 135, 139 (U. S. 1810);
Justice Story's views in Teritt v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43, 52 (U. S. 1815), and Willinon
v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 658 (U. S. 1829); also, argument of Webster in Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 581 (U. S. 1819).
10. LF GOUVERNEME NT DES JUGES ET LA LIETE COVflE LA LfrISLATIO:" sOCmtE Aux
tTATs-UxIS (PAPAs, 1921); ROGER PENTo, DEs JUGES QUX n cou Tme , P.'s: oPnuo:;s
DISSIDEMIES A LA COUR SUPREME DES kTATS-UN Is (1900-1933) 1934.
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constitutions or on-the nature of free government, built up what Duguit,
Hauriou and Lambert have called a veritable super-constitution."
With the determination to exert authority both over federal and state
legislation unqualifiedly asserted in the last decades of the nineteenth
century, the federal courts joined the state courts in declaring a large
number of state and federal legislative acts void. So aroused did public
opinion become, as a result, that the curtailment of judicial authority
was made an issue in national and state politics under the leadership
of Theodore Roosevelt and Robert M. LaFollette. Yet, even after the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Lochner v. New
York 2 it could still be argued, as was done by Charles Warren
in 1913,11 that the attitude of the Supreme Court toward social
and industrial legislation was in the main a progressive one. But
beginning with the period following the World War, a change has
come and the cases in which the court has found objections to
legislative policies under the due process, taxation, commerce, and
general welfare clauses give the unmistakable impression that the
court now looks upon itself as the first line of defense against what
is regarded as dangerous socialization of political and economic life.
The general summary of acts held void by the Supreme Court shows
the significant change in the attitude of the justices toward legislation.
With only two cases declaring acts unconstitutional in the first seventy-
five years of the operation of federal government in the United States,
and forty cases in the last thirty years, some of these involving major
governmental measures designed to aid the process of recovery from an
industrial depression, it is apparent that the function of the judiciary
with respect to the review of acts of Congress has become essentially
obstructive.'4 The extension of the regulative functions of state and
federal governments accounts in part for a larger percentage of acts
being declared void, but by no means accounts for or justifies the present
unusual mortality rate of statutes passed upon by the Court, or the
change from a procedural or jurisdictional type of review to one which
becomes a directive and controlling factor in the field of substantive law,
11. Cf. HANFns, Tim REVivAL OF NATUmAL LAW CONCEPTS (1930) 206ff., 260ff.
12. 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
13. The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court (1913), 13 COL. L. REv. 294.
14. Summary of Cases Declaring Acts of Congress void.
1789-1864--2 cases in 75 years
1864-1885-16 cases in 21 years
1886-1906--12 cases in 20 years
1906-1924--23 cases in 19 years
1924-1935-17 cases in 11 years
1789-1906-30 cases in 116 years




Appraisal of the system of judicial review of acts of Congress may
best be made upon the bases of a r6sum6 of the decisions through which
the Supreme Court has invalidated acts or parts of acts of Congress.
Despite the fact that the principle of judicial review was announced in
1803, the doctrine of legislative supremacy prevailed in the federal
government for nearly seventy years. The pronouncement of Chief
Justice Marshall in illarbury v. Madison'0 served, as Jefferson suggested,
as nothing more than an intimation to justices in future cases that they
might refuse to enforce a congressional enactment which they considered
in conflict with provisions of the Constitution. For three decades the
Supreme Court used its prestige and authority to strengthen the national
government and to restrict some of the extreme notions of state sov-
ereignty. For two decades more, it aimed to hold an even balance be-
tween federal and -state agencies. Not until the Court, under Chief
Justice Taney, made its mistake in the Dred Scott CaseO' in 1857 in
declaring the Missouri Compromise Act void, did the issue as between
legislative supremacy and the right of the courts to serve as a check
upon the political departments of the government became a vital matter
in federal politics. And for the next twenty years, though the Court
undertook on various occasions to assert its supremacy over both Con-
gress and the President in the interpretation of the Constitution, when
occasion arose the President and Congress ignored both the Constitution
and the Court to carry out policies deemed essential to the national wel-
fare. With the exception of the Dred Scott Case the first issue of major
importance involving the validity of an act of Congress, was raised in the
Civil Rights Cases in 1883.17 Judicial supremacy, though asserted at
various times as a principle of the federal Constitution, may be con-
sidered largely, then, as a development of the last few decades of the
nineteenth century, so far as its r6le in limiting the exercise of federal
authority is concerned.
This fact has significance. For the control of the courts over the
Constitution took shape in the era of rising industrialism, of the develop-
ment of large corporations and not infrequently monopoly control, of
the beginning of the regulative efforts of the state and federal govern-
ments over the commerce and industry of the nation, and of the in-
sistence of the dominant business interests, with the approval of both
major political parties, that the economic and political doctrine of
laissez faire must at all hazards be sustained. The transformation of
the balance of power in the federal system took place in the era to which
15. 1 Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803).
16. Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (U. S. 1857).
17. 109 U. S. 3 (1883). Cf. MCL.UG. T, A CoNs-rrrox Hisay o Tim- UzUrr
STATES (1935) 317, 318.
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Justice Holmes referred"8 when men, fearing they could not control
legislatures, turned to the courts for the discovery of principles either
within or outside of the constitutions to condemn policies which the
business interests of the country disapproved.
There are approximately seventy cases in which acts of Congress or
portions of acts were declared void. These may be grouped roughly
under such headings as cases affecting the jurisdiction of the courts,
acts which encroached on the powers of the states or interfered with in-
dividual rights, and limitations on the taxing powers.
Of the cases in which the court declined to accept jurisdiction con-
ferred upon it by Congress, only one is of any special importance in the
development of federal law, namely, Marbury v. Madison,0 and the
significance of this case has been exaggerated. At the time the decision
was rendered, the law establishing the office, for the attainment of which
a mandamus was sought, had been repealed; so that the judgment in
effect was rendered in a moot case. The case, however, afforded an ap-
propriate opportunity for the announcement of the Federalist doctrine
of judicial review of legislation and the supremacy of the judiciary in
constitutional interpretation, if for no other purpose than as a warning
to the Jeffersonian Democrats. The refusal of the Court in Muskrat v.
United States to give an advisory opinion to. Congress interfered with
a practice which, with judicial review of legislation as an established
feature of the Government, might have had a wholesome effect in
permitting the determination in advance of difficult issues of constitu-
tional law.20 If the Supreme Court had been called upon and expected
to render an advisory opinion regarding the constitutionality of the
National Industrial Recovery Act and of the Agricultural Adjustment
Acts at the time of their enactment, is it not probable that the decisions
arrived at would have been different from those announced in 1935 and
1936, and that the framing of a permanent national policy relating to
commerce and industry would have been facilitated?1
In approximately a score of cases the Court held that Congress had
enacted measures which encroached on the powers of the states. It is
noteworthy that the first instance of this kind arose in 1870, almost one
hundred years after the adoption of the Constitution, when Congress
attempted to fix a standard for the sale of petroleum oil.22 With but
18. COLLECTE LEGAL PAERS (1921) 184.
19. 1 Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803).
20. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1911).
21. It would seem just as probable, however, in other situations, that advisory opinions
would 'esult in voiding statutes which, had they come before the Court at a later date
and after experience in their practical application, might have been sustained. [Editor's
note.]
22. United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41 (U. S. 1869).
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two exceptions, the significant decisions of the Supreme Court thus far
had sustained the exercise of authority by the federal government and
had condemned state action which was thought to interfere with federal
authority. At about the same time as the decision in the oil standard
case, objections to attempts to tax the income of state officers and the
interest from municipal bonds were invalidated. Here, as well as in
some earlier instances involving the state taxation of federal agencies, the
Court might have applied the doctrine, that only discriminatory or un-
reasonable types of taxes interfering with state or federal agencies were
subject to condemnation. This would have permitted the uniform and
non-discriminatory application of tax laws to subjects now having an
unwarranted exemption from taxation-a plan which federal systems
such as Canada and Australia have adopted after having discarded Chief
Justice Marshall's reasoning on the doctrine of implied prohibitions.
A series of six of the decisions in this group relate to the Civil War
Amendments to the Constitution and to the attempts of Congress to
regulate political and civil rights within the states. The Supreme Court
refused to approve the efforts to &rry out the general policy of the
Northern Reconstruction leaders to change the federal relationships so
as to nationalize the control over civil rights. -4
With the exception of a few cases of minor import the remaining de-
cisions in this category related to the control over foreign and domestic
commerce. Though there are only a few such cases, they are of out-
standing significance. Congress, it was held, could not regulate trade-
marks or employers' liability when the regulation was not confined to
foreign and interstate commerce, -2 nor could interstate shipment of
goods produced by child labor be prohibited."0 In what portends to be
a new era in constitutional interpretation, the National Industrial Re-
covery Act2" and the Railroad Retirement Act were held not pertinent
to the regulation of interstate commerce, and the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act was condemned as interfering with the reserved rights and
powers of the states.29 After one hundred years of the approval and
application, with only a few outstanding exceptions, of a policy of
nationalism through the doctrine of implied powers, the Supreme Court
23. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1871); United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall.
322 (U. S. 1873).
24. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 (1876); United States v. Harris, 106 U. S.
629 (1883); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883); Baldwin v. Franks , 120 U. S. 678
(1887); James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 678 (1903); Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1
(1906).
25. Trade Mlark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (1879); Employers' Liability Cases, 203 U. S. 1
(1908).
26. Hamme r v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
27. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
28. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Rr., 295 U. S. 330 (1935).
29. United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936).
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has decided to apply a local, provincial, and implied prohibition doctrine
by means of the commerce and due process of law clauses of the Con-
stitution and of the limitations of the Tenth Amendment.
Although not applied to any significant extent until the Income Tax
Cases,3" limitations on the powers of Congress to levy taxes now loom
as among the foremost grounds, exceeding the phrase "due process of
law," for restricting the authority of Congress. Beginning with the
notable decisions of 1895 which necessitated the constitutional amend-
ment of 1913, the court condemned three laws as involving stamp taxes
on exports"' and then refused to permit the taxation of net income on
stock dividends despite the amendment to the Constitution which Mr.
Justice Holmes regarded as designed to put an end to meticulous quib-
bling as to the meaning of income in federal taxation. 2 Income taxes
on federal judges' salaries 3 and a tax on the net profits of manufacture
to prohibit child labor were also annulled. 4 Despite the Court's prev-
ious policy of approving federal tax laws obviously designed for pur-
poses of regulation 5 three acts of Congress in this category met with
disapproval on the ground that they were primarily enacted for regula-
tive purposes.30 But the most significant trend of the decisions in tax
cases came with the application of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment37 and the Marshall doctrine3" of implied prohibitions. 9
30. Pollock v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895), rehearsing, 158 U.
S. 601 (1895).
31. Fairbanks v. United States, 181 U. S. 283 (1901); United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.
S. 1 (1915); Thames and Mersey Ins. Co. v. United States, 237 U. S. 19 (1915).
32. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920).
33. Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245 (1920); Booth v. United States, 291 U. S. 339
(1934).
34. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922).
35. Champion v. Ames, 188 U: S. 321 (1903); McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27
(1904).
36. Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20 (1922); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. S. 557 (1922);
Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922). For a discussion as obiter dicta on the limits
applicable to Congress in using the taxing power as a regulative device, see Justice
Roberts' opinion in United States v. Butler', 56 Sup. Ct. 312 (1936).
37. Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531 (1927); Untermeyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440
(1928) (holding retroactive tax provisions void); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932)
(declaring invalid § 302 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1926 creating a conclusive presumption
that gifts made within two years prior to the death of the donor weve made in con-
templation of death and requiring the value of such gifts to be included in computing the
value of the net taxable estate); Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571 (1934) (preventing
taxation of policies of yearly renewable term insurance issued under the War Risk In-
surance Act, on the ground that contracts of the United States would thereby be
breached).
38. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316, 425ff. (U. S. 1819).
39. National Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 508 (1928) (holding void
portions of § 213 of the Revenue Act of 1921, taxing the gross income of insurance com-
panies in so far as it was applied to the income from state and municipal bonds); Indian
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The encroachments upon individual rights to which the Supreme
Court objected related primarily to the protection of vested rights (3
cases), the guarding of jury trial (5 cases), and claims that due process
of law was violated (4 cases), and one each under the following phrases
or provisions of the Constitution,-ex post facto law, unreasonable
searches and seizures, protection against self-incrimination, admission of
improper evidence, and interference with individual privileges. Though
the Court in interpreting the constitutional provisions protecting in-
dividual rights veered in the direction of the narrow or common law
interpretation of the procedural requirements of the Constitution, only
a few of these cases involved matters of serious or vital concern to
citizens. The method of securing evidence for conviction of offenses
under federal laws was made more difficult than is the practice under cor-
responding procedural rules in the states."'° The federal government
was required to pay the value of a franchise in eminent domain proceed-
ings to condemn a toll bridge.' Congress in its war-time control of the
necessaries of life was denied authority to impose penalties without
making the nature of the offense specific. But the outstanding de-
cision in this group condemned the minimum wage law of the District
of Columbia and inferentially rendered void similar state laws. 3
On the other hand, the Court did not protect either citizens or aliens
from what was deemed by many to be an unreasonable and unduly op-
pressive Espionage Act. It has not prevented the executive from sus-
pending the writ of habeas corpus44 or instituting a blockade contrary
to express provisions of the Constitution and of thereby establishing a
veritable "state of siege" so far as individual rights are concerned, when
a condition of war is imminent or in progress. Though the guarantees
in favor of individual liberty are occasionally invoked to protect the
utterance of liberal or even radical views, such instances of judicial pro-
tection to individual rights are so rare as to be negligible. As a rule,
Mlotocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570 (1931) (preventing the enforcement of
§ 600 of the Revenue Act of 1924 in so far as an attempt was made to apply it to the sale
of motorcydes to a municipal corporation); Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.
S. 393 (1932) (holding void a tax on a lease to a private company for the eatraction of
gas and oil from lands granted to the state for the use of its public schools).
40. Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S.
547 (1892).
41. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 143 U. S. 312 (1S93).
42. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. S (1921).
43. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
44. Cf. the effotrts of Chief Justice Taney to prevent President Lincoln from suspending
the writ of habeas corpus without a prior grant of such authority from Congre3. Mc-
P~masox, THE Poric.L HTSoRY or = UNnnD STATES or A2AmnnCA DUMo ai G rlT
REaB.io- (1876) 154.
45. See approval of Lincoln's order establishing a blockade of Southern ports, Prize
Cases, 2 Black. 635 (U. S. 1862).
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legislative and executive interferences with individual rights have met
with the Court's approval. The emotional appeal to support judicial
review of acts of Congress which centers around the preservation of the
sacred and inalienable individual rights has a slender basis in the Court's
record to date.
Decisions holding that Congress could not adopt the workmen's
compensation laws of the state46 or that Congress could not limit the
authority of the President to remove officers, 47 the latter now consider-
ably restricted by a subsequent pronouncement, 8 tended only slightly to
affect the authority of Congress.
It is contended that, since the court has found so few acts of Congress
to condemn during a century and a half,4 there is little ground for ap-
prehension if Congress be allowed more extensive powers. It is claimed
by others, however, that Congress has frequently been deterred from
passing acts because of the belief that they would be declared void by
the courts. But although the probability that acts were likely to meet
with judicial disapproval has no doubt served as a deterrent factor in
relation to certain legislative proposals, the importance of such a check
may readily be exaggerated. The strikingly few instances in which
legislatures violate the provisions of written constitutions where legis-
lative supremacy prevails indicates that legislators normally take as
seriously their duties and responsibilities in regard to the support and
protection of the written fundamental law as do the judges.
Even if all of the decisions in which the Supreme Court held acts of
Congress invalid were correctly decided, there has been a distinct loss
in removing from active public discussion and determination certain
vital issues of national policy. For, over against the advantages gained
by deferring to the judiciary on important issues of public authority
except when an extraordinary wave of public sentiment assures a reversal
by constitutional amendment, is the fact that the people lose the political
experience and education, as well as the social stimulus that comes from
facing an issue and coming to grip with its determination. Though the
popular decision may be wrong, the experience gained in its discussion
and determination results in a useful and provocative exchange of ideas
and in the strengthening of the political fibre. This is the doctrine that
Justice Holmes advocated in and out of the sessions of the Court, namely,
that it is desirable to permit the people through their authorized political
agencies to experiment in the field of political and economic regulation,
46. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1920).
47. Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926).
48. Humphrey's Exec. v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935).
49. It is estimated that 24,300 public laws were enacted by Congress from 1789 to 1936
and that less than 65 separate acts were declared void. See the U. S. News, Jan. 20, 1936.
[Vol. 45
JUDICIAL REVIEW
regardless of whether the experimentation may seem to many individuals
to be reasonable or advantageous.
IV
Some of the apparent weaknesses and defects of judicial nullification
of acts of Congress may be illustrated by a consideration of the reasoning
and the implications of recent decisions. By a series of judicial pro-
nouncements the federal courts, following the reasoning and dicta in
certain state cases, changed the meaning of due process of law from a
procedural limitation, applicable primarily to methods of apprehending,
trying and condemning individuals for alleged criminal acts, to a limita-
tion applicable to legislative and executive acts, when from the point of
view of judges they appeared unreasonable or arbitrary. This change
of interpretation of the most significant phrase in the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments has been so frequently and fully considered that it
need not be elaborated upon for present purposes. 0 It is not an exag-
geration to state, however, that this judicial extension of the meaning
of due process of law converted judicial review of legislation into a form
of corrective quite different from that prevailing heretofore and had a
far-reaching effect on many phases of constitutional interpretation. The
new version of due process of law gave sanction for the judicial con-
demnation of labor laws,51 of retroactive provisions in federal tax laws, 12
of railroad pension legislation,13 and of the attempt of Congress to grant
relief to a certain class of debtors.r It renders applicable as a test for
all federal laws the concept of reasonableness, which involves a variety
of connotations and furnishes legal sanction for the consideration of the
wisdom or expediency of legislation. It was the application of this test
to state enactments, now held as a necessary standard for all federal acts,
which led Justice Holmes to raise a protest a few years before he re-
signed from the bench, that "as the decisions now stand I see no limit
but the sky to the invalidating of those rights [of the states under the
So. Cf. my article, Judidd Review of Legislation in the United States and the Doctrine
of Vested Rights and of Inplied Lfmiiaions on Legislatures (1924) 3 Tx. L. Ras,. 1, and
monograph on TnE REvivAL oF NAruaL LAW COxcsCw. (1930) cc. ,-VIII; alco, Corwin,
The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Ciil War (1911), 24 HMrv. L. RE%. 366,
460. Reference to this change was made by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Whitney v. California,
274 U. S. 357, 373 (1926) when he said: "Despite arguments to the contrary which had
seemed to me persuasive, it is settled that the due process clau-se of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure."
51. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1903) (ten-hour law in bakeries); Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923) (minimum wage law for District of Columbia).
52. Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531 (1927).
53. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton' Rr., 295 U. S. 330 (1935).
54. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 55 Sup. Ct. 869 (1935).
1936]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Fourteenth Amendment] if they happen to strike a majority of this
court as for any reason undesirable. '""
Spending Power
There is no provision in the federal Constitution that a tax shall be
for a public purpose and few provisions of such import are found in the
state constitutions." The notion that a tax may be levied for a public
purpose only, however, was formulated by the state justices about the
middle of the nineteenth century to place a curb on the trend toward
extravagant governmental appropriations. But restrictions upon such
forms of public expenditure were frequently prohibited by amendments
to the state constitutions. Justice Miller, in a case relating to an issue
of bonds to build a factory, asserted on behalf of the Justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States, that the requirement of public
purpose was a foundation principle of all constitutional government.'
Judge Cooley, who contended in People v. Salem 9 that "all govern-
mental powers exist for public purposes" had stated as a dictum in his
Constitutional Limitations that "taxation having for its only legitimate
object the raising of money for public purposes, and the proper needs
of government, the exaction of moneys from the citizens for other
purposes is not a proper exercise of this power and must therefore be un-
authorized."60  The judicial construction of implied tax limitations on
the legislature was progressing so rapidly that Cooley ventured to as-
sert in 1879 that ". .. whatever differences of opinion may exist regarding
the admissibbility of taxation in particular cases, the fundamental require-,
ment, that the purpose must be public, will be conceded on all sides."0' 1
55. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 595 (1930).
56. For a summary note relating to such constitutional provisions, see McAllister, Public
Purpose in Taxation (1930) 18 CMtw. L. Rzv. 138.
57. Speaking for the majority of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Sharples3 v.
The Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 168 (1853), upholding the authority of the legisla-
ture to empower city officials to subscribe to and sell bonds to finance the purchase of the
stock of railroads, Chief Justice Black said that, the general grant of legislative power did
not include authority to raise funds for a private purpose, for "taxation is a mode of
raising revenue for public purposes. When it is prostituted to objects in no way con-
nected with the public interests or welfare, it ceases to be taxation and becomes plunder."
For an earlier formulation of the public purpose doctrine by Chancellor Kent of New York
see Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns Ch. 162, 166 (N. Y. 1816).
58. Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (U. S. 1874).
59. 20 Mich. 452, 478 (1870).
60. 1868 edition, at 487, 488. See also opinion of Chief Justice Dillon of Iowa in
Hanson v. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28, 43 (1869).
61. Coor.ay oN TAXATION (1st ed. 1881) 67. In his CONsrix-loNAx. Li rrrAnoNs (8th
ed. 1927), Cooley stated his political philosophy, which he was diligently trying to translate
into constitutional law, as follows: "There is no rule or principle known to ou'r system under
which private property can be taken from one man and transferred to another for the
private use and benefit of such other person, whether by general laws or special enactment.
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Following the reasoning of Cooley and Dillon, the public purpose princi-
ple as implied from the inalienable rights clause of the bill of rights or
the due process of law and eminent domain provisions of state constitu-
tions was held to prevent the taking of the property of a citizen for a
private use.
Transferring these dicta to the realm of federal jurisprudence was a
process which apparently was making headway rather slowly 2 until
Justice Roberts interpolated into the language of the federal Constitu-
tion a new form of the public purpose principle that "the word [tax]
has never been thought to connote the expropriation of money from one
group for the benefit of another."0 3 By this dictum an amendment to
the Constitution is in process of formulation which may change to a
considerable degree the functions exercised by the federal government.
Are not by this reasoning all forms of aid to individuals indulged in by
Congress from the beginning of the government, including numerous
tariff acts, pension laws, aid to sufferers from flood or drought, as well
as relief measures of every type, and a considerable variety of taxes
levied by the federal government, subject to serious constitutional in-
firmities? Or will the Supreme Court Justices in future cases shrink
from the exercise of the extravagant form of judicial censorship fore-
shadowed in such a dictum?
Separation and Delegation of Powers
Through the presumed requirements of the principle of the separa-
tion of powers,6" with the correlative principle that the legislature cannot
delegate its functions to any other agency, new and unwarranted criteria
of judicial review of congressional acts are being aimed at still other
legislative and executive exercises of power. Justice Cardozo in his con-
curring opinion in the decision in the N.R.A. Case speaks of the dangers
The purpose must be public, and must have reference to the needs of government." As
indicative of the trend in the states, see Lowell v. Boston, 111 las. 454 (1873), con-
demning an issue of bonds for the purpose of making loans to individuals for rebuilding
homes burned in the Boston fire, and opinion of Chief Justice Appleton upholding an
injunction to prevent the town of Jay from making a loan to secure a mawmill and a box
factory. This, said the Chief Justice, is "communism incipient, if not perfected.' Allen
v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. 124 (172).
62. In Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U. S. 217 (1917) the Supreme Court took: jurizdic-
tion to determine whether under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment taxes
levied to operate a fuel yard were levied for a public purpose, but in this case as in Gre .n
v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 238 (1920), involving experiments in the field of industrial enter-
prise by the State of North Dakota, and in City of Boston v. Jackson, 260 U. S. 309
(1922), concerning an expenditure of public money to aid a publicly operated subway sys-
tem, the members of the Court could see no violations of the public purpose principle.
63. United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 317 (1936).
64. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); A. L. A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
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involved in "unconfined and vagrant power" and objects to "a roving
commission to inquire into evils, and upon discovery correct them."
No definite or even approximate standard has been provided, he states,
to which legislation must conform. Reference is made to ethical or
commercial standards that can be known or predicted in advance, which
were lacking in the act of Congress.0 5 But is it not apparent that many
of the so-called standards which legislatures have laid down for admin-
istrative agencies, now as a rule approved by the courts, are in the nature
of general orders in exceedingly vague terms and which become concrete
under the direction of the administration both in the determination of
standards and in their application? 0 The requirement in health laws
that the premises be kept in a sanitary condition, in workmen's com-
pensation provisions that factories be rendered safe for employees, in
insurance acts that a company be reliable and entitled to public con-
fidence, and in rate regulation that undue preference be not granted
to shippers,--these and a variety of other general phrases directed to
administrative officers, frequently included in statutes and usually ap-
proved by the courts, mean no more than the frequent admonition in the
interstate commerce acts that the Commission should determine a ques-
tion "as in its judgment the public interest demands," or that it should
sanction only arrangements which are "just and reasonable."07 In all of
these instances the legislature authorizes and instructs administrative
officers to formulate standards and to lay down rules for the guidance of
individual conduct and it is the enforcement of such rules with the ex-
perience gained thereby which gives form and content to the purpose
expressed by the legislature. It was this sort of administrative action
which Circuit Judge Learned Hand had in mind when he said, in re-
lation to the National Industrial Recovery Act: "The phrase 'fair com-
petition' seems to me a definite enough cue or ground plan for the
elaboration of a code." 68
It is a rather strange procedure for the members of the Supreme Court
to express much concern regarding the fear of determination of matters
by coordinate departments of the government in accordance with vague
phrases involving "vagrant" powers, especially since the chief charge
65. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 551 (1935).
66. See, e.g., authority granted to Secretary of War to remove structures regarded as
Uunreasonable obstructions" to navigation, approved in Union Bridge Co. v. United States,
204 U. S. 364 (1907); power of Secretary of Labor to deport aliens who are "undesirable
residents" of the United States, approved in Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32 (1924), and
authority of Secretary of Agriculture to prescribe "just and Yeasonable" commissions for
livestock brokers, approved in Tagg Bros. & Morehead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420 (1930).
67. N. Y. Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12 (1932). For similar
phrases of a discretionary nature consult Sum ", THE INTERSTATE Com=CE Com-
InssION: A STUDY In A DxmTRATIvE LAwv AND PROCEDURE (1931) part II, 397 ft.
68. United States v. Schechter Poultry Corporation, 76 F. (2d) 617, 624 (1935).
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against the Supreme Court in many of its decisions under the due pro-
cess of law and equal protection of the laws clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments is that these phrases are in no sense standards
and that the Court has nevertheless exercised by means of them for
many years an effective censorship over social and economic legislation,
acting as a kind of "House of Lords" for both the federal and state gov-
ernments.a It would seem that the real "vagrant and unconfined" power
in the American system of government is that of the courts acting as
censors of legislative and executive acts. All other departments and
agencies of governments are subject to regular and effective checks
when their acts must be justified before the bar of public opinion.
The courts alone can give final judgments whether in accordance with
standards or no standards; and as far as the Supreme Court of the
United States is concerned, a full and effective accounting before the
people, due to the extreme difficulty of amending the Constitution, may
be deferred for a generation or more.
The Court in recent decisions gives the impression that it is confined
by the inexorable logic of the written constitution which it is charged
to interpret. Justice Roberts, in the majority opinion of the A.A4.
Case stated:
"It is sometimes said that the court assumes a power to overrule or
control the acts of the people's representatives. This is a misconception.
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land ordained and established
by the people. All legislation must conform to the principles it lays down.
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not
conforming to the Constitutional mandate, the judicial branch of the
government has only one duty, to lay the article of the Constitution which
is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the
latter squares with the former. All the court does or can do is to announce
its considered judgment upon the question. The only power it has, if
such it may be called, is the power of judgment. This court neither ap-
proves nor condemns any legislative policy. Its delicate and difficult
69. Albert M. Males called attention to this phase of judicial review in 1913 %,,hen he
,observed that: "In addressing the Court in due process cases one should not commence
with the usual salutation 'may it please the court', instead one should say, 'My Lords.'
Backed by and charged with the enforcement of the due process clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, the Supreme Court of the United States is the American substi-
tute for the British House of Lords. It constitutes the real and only conservative second
chamber of the federal government. It is a second consetvative chamber for each of the
state governments.... Like all conservative second chambers the Supreme Court and the
due process clause are in a hopeless dilemma." New Methods in Due-Proces Cases (1918)
12 Asm. POL. Sci. R-v. 241. Cf. also Sayre, Minimum Wage Decision: How the Supreme
Court becomes virtually a House of Lords (May 1, 1923) 50 SurvEr 150-151.
70. An "unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of
the government is subject to judicial restraint," said Justice Stone, whereas "the only check
upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint." Dissenting opinion in
United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct., 312, 325 (1936).
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office is to ascertain and declare whether the legislation is in accord with
or in contravention of the provisions of the Constitution, and having done
that, its duty ends." 7'
This language is reminiscent of the mechanical approach to the law of
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when judicial review
of legislation was in process of formulation. 72  Though repeated at
various times by justices inclined toward a mechanistic approach to the
law,78 its fallacies have been so frequently exposed by the "realistic" and
"sociological" jurists74 that it takes considerable temerity to repeat the
statement today as an inescapable truism.
The dissenting justices, speaking through Justice Stone, scarcely give
this "juristic ritual" or "legal mythology", as Frank calls it, respectful
consideration. In a sharply worded and caustic opinion the majority are
impliedly at least charged by the minority with overstepping their
judicial duty and of sanctioning a tortured construction of the Con-
stitution which leads to curtailment of the powers of Congress by
"judicial fiat." What is made to appear as an application of the rule
of law or the plain and simple operation of the doctrine of ultra vires
conceals an issue which is more fundamental, namely, by what standard
is legislative and administrative action to be approved or condemned
by justices who are conceded as having for most purposes the final
judgment as to its validity. With such phrases as due process of law and
general welfare as guides, or with the demarcation of powers as national
or state where governmental functions necessarily overlap, the decision
is made on the basis of the conscious or unconscious assumption of the
social desirability of certain consequences and a judgment is rendered
that is presumed to promote those consequences.75 When such indefinite
standards are applied by justices "accustomed to believe that it is the
business of courts to sit in judgment on the wisdom of legislative action,"
71. United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 318 (1936). For a similar view as to the
detached attitude of Justices in considering the validity of legislation, compare comments
of Justice Roberts in Railroad Retirement Boar'd v. Alton Ry. Co., 295 U. S. 330 (1935).
72. Cf. Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence (1908) 8 COL. L. REv. 605; and state de-
cisions, Grimball v. Ross, T. U. P. Charlt. 175, 178 (Ga. 1808); Byrne v. Stewart, 3 De5.
466, 477 (S. C. 1812).
73. See similar opinion by Justice Sutherland in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447,
488 (1923).
74. See JEROmE FRANx, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930), and Are Judges Human?
(1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 17, 231; Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence (1930) 30 COL.
L. REV. 431, and The Constitution as an Institution (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 1; Powell, The
Judiciality of Minimum Wage Legislation (1924) 37 HAv. L. REv. 545. For a comparison
of the "mechanical theory" and the theory of "free legal decision," see my article, General
Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic Influences in the Decisions
of Judges (1922) 17 ftL. L. REv. 96.
75. Walter Wheeler Cook, on Legal Methods in the Fxrm CoNmENm OF TneaCnEs or
INTERNATi ONAL LAW (1933) 56.
[Vol. 45
JUDICIAL REVIEW
it is timely for honored and respected members of the highest tribunal
to remind their brethren and the people of the nation that "courts are not
the only agency of government that must be assumed to have the
capacity to govern. 76
In reality, the rigid limitations which the Court interprets and applies
in order to rebuke sternly the legislative and executive departments, are
largely judge-made limitations read into the Constitution by justices who
looked with disfavor upon the tendencies toward governmental paternal-
ism and had little respect for popular government as carried out through
representatives and executives elected by the people.7' An example of
such a limitation is apparent in the interpretation of the theory of the
separation of powers, now used as a maxim to prevent the delegation
of legislative and administrative powers. Though the theory of the
separation of powers was formulated and adopted in certain state con-
stitutions beginning in 1776, it is a significant fact that for approximately
a century legislative, executive, and judicial powers were frequently
mingled in the face of this theoretic division. The legislatures acted as
courts of final resort, and in many respects exercised a virtual supremacy
over the other departments. They delegated powers freely to executives
and at times to courts with only an occasional reversal. Primarily the
theory of the separation of powers was used to protect the judiciary from
interference with judicial powers by the legislatures and to give aid and
sanction to the developing doctrine of judicial review of legislation.
Those responsible for the adoption of the theory of separation of powers
as a feature of state and federal constitutional law, asserts Mr. Bondy,
were unfamiliar with any supposed possibility of classifying powers ac-
cording to their intrinsic nature. As understood at the time, the separa-
tion theory meant that "any power not expressly vested by the constitu-
tion in either of the departments or other governmental authority, irre-
spective of its nature, may be assumed by the legislature, or delegated
76. From Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. CL 312,
329 ff. (1936).
77. "The paternal theory of government," said Justice Brewer, "is to me odious.
The utmost possible liberty to the individual, the fullest possible protection to him and
his property, is both the limitation and duty of government." Justice Brewer di.zenting in
Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 551 (1892). Justice Brewers view later became the
doctrine of the majority of the court. See Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v.
Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (1890); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1S97); Lochner
v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (190s); also Justice Peckham's views in In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y.
9s (1885).
78. See comment of Thomas Reed Powell that the theory of the separation of powers
so far as the federal government is concerned "becomes through judicial decision a rul-
of law." Separation of Powers: Administrative Exercise of Legislative and Judidal Power
(June, 1912) 27 PoL. Sd. Q. 215. Most of the cases to which Powell refers as giving force
to the theory of the separation of powers were decided after 1885 when the courts were
discovering new meanings for due process of law.
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to either of the other departments or any other governmental agency
without violating the distributing clause," 79 or in the words of Justice
Story:
"When we speak of the three great departments of government, and
maintain that that separation is indispensable to public liberty, we are to
understand the maxim in a limited sense ..... [i.e] the true meaning is
that the whole power of one of these departments should not be exercised
by the same hands, which possess the whole power of either of the other
departments"
and that such exercise of the whole would subvert the principles of a
free constitution." Upon this hypothesis both federal and state govern-
ments acted for well nigh a century, following the admonition of Chief
Justice Marshall to the effect that
"the difference between departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature
makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law, but
the maker of the law may commit something to the discretion of the other
departments, and the precise boundary of this power is a subject of
delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a court will not enter unneces-
sarily."81
It was not until the decades following the Civil War that the state
courts, inbued with the spirit of laissez faire economics and politics and
therefore seeking grounds to check the growing powers of popular con-
trol over political and economic affairs, turned to the theory of separa-
tion of powers with the correlative principle of non-delegation of au-
thority82 as well as to the due process clause as convenient weapons of
attack upon what the judges deemed the exercise of unwise legislative and
executive powers. The precept of judicial construction was then an-
nounced that the discretionary power, in so far as the carrying out of
state functions is concerned, is granted by the theory of separation of
powers to the legislature alone, with the executive authority acting in a
ministerial capacity. Through numerous court decisions, this judge-
made theory has stood in the way of the development of effective ad-
ministrative methods in the states. Workmen's compensation acts, zon-
ing provisions, control over water rights, the administration of labor laws,
social welfare legislation, and other types of public control were nullified
by what appeared to many to be unduly restrictive judicial pronounce-
ments based upon the separation of powers theory. Fortunately, the
79. William Bondy, The Separation of Governmental Powers in History, in Theory, and
in the Constitutions, V COLUMBIA UmN~vERS~ STUDiES iN HISTORY, EcoNomics AND Pumac
LAw (1896) 210.
80. CowmNTARIs oN TmE CoNsTITUTioN Or THE UNrnD STATES (5th ed. 1891) 1, 393.
81. Wayman v. Southatd, 10 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1825).
82. For data as to the origin of the latter phase of the theory, consult Duff and White-
side, Delegata Potestas non Potest Delegari: A Maxim of American Constitutlonal Law
(1929) 14 ComN. L. Q. 168.
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state legislatures have been freed both by constitutional amendments
and by changes in judicial attitudes from many of the shackles construed
upon their powers. So marked was the change in this respect that Elihu
Root, in a plea for the development of administrative law with a system
of effective controls over administrative agencies, observed several de-
cades ago that
"the old doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative power has virtually
retired from the field and given up the fight. There will be no withdrawal
from these experiments. We shall go on; we shall expand them, whether
we approve theoretically or not, because such agencies furnish protection
to rights and obstacles to wrong-doing which, under our new social and
industrial conditions, cannot be practically accomplished by the old and
simple procedure of legislatures and courts as in the last generation. 3"
Chief Justice Hughes, with the application of a new version of the sep-
aration of powers theory in federal jurisprudence,84 demands for execu-
tive action such as that envisaged in the National Industrial Recovery
Act a quasi-judicial procedure of the type of the Federal Trade Com-
mission and of the Interstate Commerce Commission with ample pro-
visions "for formal complaints, for notice and hearing, for appropriate
findings of fact supported by adequate evidence, and for judicial review
to give assurance that the action of the commission is taken within its
statutory authority."1ss This mode of procedure can have no other effect
than to render Congress and the President impotent to deal with the
conditions designed to be regulated under the recovery act. It is quite
beyond the scope or method of a legislative body to prepare and enact
codes of fair business practice for thousands of types of business and
industry or even to formulate in general outline the standards to be
applied in the formation of- such codes. Nor could the President with-
out undue delay and inexpedient limitations of his action follow the
procedure of the Federal Trade Commission or the Interstate Commerce
Commission in the enforcement of such standards. The primary object
of such a holding is, indeed, in the words of the Supreme Court in a
previous case relating to the separation of powers, "to stop the wheels
of government and bring about confusion, if not paralysis, in the conduct
of the public business." ' A more reasonable point of view in the light of
modem conditions and the requirements of effective public administra-
tion was expressed by Circuit Judge Manton who quoted the language of
earlier decisions to the effect that
83. Presidential Address before the American Bar Association, (1916) 41 A. B. A.
REP'. 368, 369.
84. For summa-ry of doctrines applied by the courts in previous cases relative to the
delegations of power, see Cousens, The Delegation of Federal Legisative Power to Execu-
tive Officials (1935) 33 Mica. L. REV. 512.
85. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States, 295 U. S. 49S (1935).
86. Cf. Union Bridge Company v. United States, 204 U. S. 364 (1907).
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"Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable,
and from the necessities of the case was compelled to leave to executive
officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute.
To deny the power of Congress to delegate such a duty would in effect
amount but to declaring that the plenary power vested in Congress to
regulate foreign commerce could not be efficaciously exerted."87
But in this case as well as in the Panama Refining Company Case"8
the Chief Justice, with his associates approving, apparently gives ex-
pression to his feeling of resentment toward the modern tendencies in
the development of administrative law. In accordance with previously
expressed views"0 he joins with ardor such critics of recent methods in
public administration as the Lord Chief Justice of England, who char-
acterized the modern tendencies in administrative law as The New Des-
potism,10 and Professor Allen of Oxford University who styled the same
tendencies as Bureaucracy Triumphant. 1 But a parliamentary in-
vestigation instigated by such criticisms found little to condemn in the
English practice of delegating broad and significant powers to admin-
istrative officers. 2 The practice of granting the Ministers authority not
only to administer but to a large extent to make the law is now a gener-
ally approved policy of the English government. 3
Commerce Power
In the decisions in the Railroad Retirement and the N.R.A. Cases the
Supreme Court interpreted interstate commerce in accordance with the
theory of James Madison "that different parts of the same instrument
ought to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part," and that
the Constitution and the laws enacted under it must permit both the
state and federal governments to function with a reasonable degree of
effectiveness and with no undue interference by one division of the
government with the functions which are presumed to be allotted to the
other. Yet, although in the past the Court has at times followed the
limitations applicable to federal powers as envisaged by the Madison
federalism doctrine,94 the interpretations of the Court have more fre-
87. 76 F. (2d) 617, 621 (1935).
88. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1934).
89. See comments quoted in the N. Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1931 at p. 8; also, Report of
Special Committee on Administrative Law (1934) 59 A. B. A. Rep. 200 ff.
90. LoRD HEWART, THE NEw DEsronsix (London, 1929).
91. CARLETON K ALLEN, BuREAucRAc~y TkruMPEUNT (London, 1931).
92. Committee on Ministers' Powers (Donoughmore Committee) presented to Parlia-
ment in April, 1932, Cmd. 4060. Cf. WILLs, THE PAR.iumtrARY PowxRs OF ENo0asn DE.
pARTmES (1933) 174 ff.
93. For an account of the growth of delegated legislation in England, consult mVrs,
op. cit. supra note 92.
94. Edward S. Corwin has analyzed Madison's notions regarding federalism in Congress'




quently followed the line of extending the scope and significance of the
powers to be exercised under the commerce clause, and of restricting
the authority of the states either for purposes of regulation or taxation.
Beginning with the decision of Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v.
Maryland,5 it has been made clear that the states are inhibited from
any substantial interferences with commerce, and that it is the duty of
the federal government to keep the channels of commerce free from
obstructions in order to assure its regular and continuous flow.
"The genius and character of the whole government seems to be," as
conceived by Marshall, "that its action is to be applied to all the external
concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the
states generally, but not to those which are completely within a particular
state, which do not affect other states."
In recent years the Court has tended toward the adoption of the doctrine
that not only is the federal government given authority over commerce
in a direct sense, but it is also the duty of the federal government to
foster and protect commerce so far as it may be disturbed by indirect
factors and influences in the states. In Unitcd Mine Workers v.
Coronado Coal Company90 Chief Justice Taft said:
"It is clear from these cases97 that if Congress deems certain recurring
practices, though not really part of interstate commerce, likely to ob-
struct, restrain or burden it, it has the power to subject them to national
supervision and restraint."
The Chief Justice was thus affirming a view expressed by Justice Holmes
nearly a score of years before when he suggested that Congress had
authority to interfere "in cases where such interference is deemed neces-
sary for the protection of commerce among the states. ''Os Following
this reasoning, Circuit Judge Manton expressed a view according to
which the major features of the National Recovery Administration as
well as other phases of recent federal legislation could have been sus-
tained when he observed that "trade practices which, in normal times,
would have had only an indirect and incidental effect upon interstate
commerce, may substantially burden interstate commerce during a period
of overproduction, unfair competition and a reduced purchasing
power." 99
From yet another point of view, the Court's decision might have been
favorable to the exercise of federal powers in both of the above cases.
95. 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827). 96. 259 U. S. 344, 405 (1922).
97. Citing Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375 (1905); United States v. Patten,
226 U. S. 525 (1913); United States v. Ferger, 250 U. S. 199 (1919); Railroad Comm. of
Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. Rr. Co., 257 U. S. 563 (1922); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.
S. 495 (1922).
98. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 400 (1905).
99. United States v. Schechter Poultry Corporation, 76 F. (2d) 620 (193S).
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Although the doctrine announced by Chief Justice Jay and accepted by
a majority of the Federalists that there is a common law of the United
States, was rejected in United States v. Hudson and Goodwin,"'0 and
although the doctrine of the Goodwin Case has been approved many
times, nevertheless the doctrine was in effect considerably modified by
a series of decisions which followed the Civil War. When Congress
began to regulate, with the approval of the courts, lotteries,10 1 the
opium traffic, 02 bills of lading,'03 and similar transactions coming within
the range of commerce, the reasoning was adopted by the Court that
transportation of persons or commodities deemed harmful or detri-
mental to the interests of the public welfare might be regulated by Con-
gress, or, if need be, prohibited from being transported in the channels
of commerce. If the desired regulation could not be brought within the
range of commerce, steps were taken to attain the same result by' means
of prohibitory taxation. By this kind of "covert legislation", as Judge
Hough described it, °4 a type of federal police power became well estab-
lished as one of the features of the federal system. 0 The Court called
a halt temporarily, at least, to this type of federal control over interstate
business in condemning the Child Labor and the Future Trading Acts.100
Despite the reasoning in the Child Labor Case, the gradual develop-
ment of a federal police power over harmful and criminal acts in trans-
actions involving more than one state, along with the principle which
the Court on several occasions approved, that acts having an indirect ef-
fect on commerce were excepted from control by the states, opened the
way for an approval of acts of Congress such as those recently con-
demned by the Court. Thus, as a result of the growth of the federal
police power through the extended application of the commerce clause
and the control of state and interstate affairs by means of the taxing
power, men began to proceed on the hypothesis that the federal govern-
ment was authorized, as it was argued in the federal Convention and as
the leading Federalists insisted, to legislate when urgent necessity re-
100. 7 Cranch 32 (U. S. 1812).
101. Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903).
102. United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919).
103. United States v. Fe~ger, 250 U. S. 199 (1919).
104. According to judge Hough, "Congress finally chose the taxing power rather than
the postal monopoly as the constitutional support for the regulation of a business almost
invariably intrastate and not yet regarded as affected by a public use." Covert Legislation
and the Constitution (1917) 30 HARv. L. Ray. 801.
105. For an account of the gradual development of a national police power with the
approval of the courts, see Cushman, (Studies in the) Police Power oVP the National Gov.
ernnent (1920) 4 AEINN. L. Rav. 247 and 402, and (1921) 5 id. at 1.
106. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259
U. S. 20 (1922), and Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922); but see Board of Trade v.




quired for the general interests of the United States and to assume those
functions concerning which the states are separately incompetent. °1
That the Supreme Court could have approved the National Industrial
Recovery Act by its own reasoning in previous decisions is apparent also
when one examines the practice and precedents in relation to the exercise
of extraordinary powers to deal with former emergency conditions. If
this act is unconstitutional, then various phases of the activities and
functions performed by the federal government from 1914 to 1920
were invalid, leaving out of account extreme powers conceded to the
legislative and executive departments during previous emergency periods.
Powers no less wide, general, and significant were given to President
Wilson, Congress having directed him as Commander-in-Chief to win the
war,'"I just as President Roosevelt was directed to promote recovery
from some of the disastrous results of an economic depression. May the
Court not have held on the basis of reason and precedents that the
nation faced an emergency in 1933 as it did in 1916-1917?19 Using
the Court's own language, "plainly circumstances may so change in
time or differ in space as to clothe with such an interest [public] what
at other times or in other places would be a matter of purely private
concern," or as expressed on another occasion, "a limit in time to tide
over a passing trouble may well justify a law that could not be upheld
as a permanent one.""' The fact that acts of Congress designed to meet
the war emergency and that the wholesale delegation of powers to the
President were not opposed by the Courts, has led to the conclusion that
"the power of the federal government to prosecute a war is as compre-
hensive as the needs of the situation demand."
The authority assumed by Congress and the President during the World
War and approved by the Supreme Court in several important instances
such as the Adamson Labor Act and the acts restricting increases in
rents, merely seemed to carry to its logical conclusion a line of reason-
ing and interpretation which began with Hamilton and which was
107. See Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States than One (1934) 47 Hnv.
L. RE V. 1351.
108. "So great were the powers possessed by President Wilson," says Professor Fen-
wick, "that for the time being his position was one of virtual dictatorship over a wide field
covering whatever activities of the people might in the opinion of Congres3 be made to
contribute, whether affirmatively by legislation or negatively by prohibition, to the
strengthening of the military arm of the government." PoLmc.% SystAxs n. Tn=so,;
(1920) 133.
109. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in taking the oath of office said: 'I shall ask
the Congress for broad executive power to wage war against the emergency as great as the
power which would be given to me if we were, in fact, invaded by a foreign foe."
110. Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332 (1917); Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135 (1921).
That the courts may apply a different standard when "an emergency ceases or the facts
change" is recognized in an opinion by Justice Holmes in Chastleton Corporation v. Sin-
clair, 264 U. S. 543 (1924).
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arriving at the view that, when required by the public interest and the
general welfare, any authority which may be necessary to meet an
emergency, and the most important powers which are desirable to carry
out the ordinary ends of governments in peace time, may be assumed
by the federal government without the necessity of amending the Con-
stitution. For it is well to note that the process of expanding federal
powers by interpretation to a point at which those things might be
satisfactorily regulated which in the judgment of the President and
Congress seemed desirable had, with few exceptions, come to be the
settled policy of the country, carried out largely by mere interpretations
and expansions of the terms and phrases of the federal Constitution.
There were, of course, momentary reactions when the federal courts
reminded Congress and the President that the Constitution intended to
assure the continuous functioning of a dual system with state and federal
governments operating at the same time and that neither could inter-
fere seriously with the activities properly belonging to the other. 1,
But these reactions tended merely to slow down what appeared as the
inevitable process of centralization based upon *the insistent demands
arising from social and economic conditions which, as business, manu-
facturing, agriculture, and commercial relations generally became na-
tional in their essential operations, rendered futile the efforts to retain
the force and effectiveness of state boundaries.
For more than forty years after its establishment the Supreme Court
conceived its duty and function as requiring the support of the centraliz-
ing and nationalistic trends of the time. In a nation building a political
and industrial empire the justices adopted principles compatible with
progress and expansion. This attitude of "high judicial statesmanship,"
as it is frequently called, strengthened the judiciary in public esteem and
assured its success as the stabilizing force of the government. For the
last fifty years, however, the attitude of the justices has been directed to
the discovery of limits upon the activities and functions of government.
The avenues of public regulations, whether by state or federal action,
have indeed been "cabined and confined." The outlook of the justices
has been toward the past rather than the future; judicial statesmanship,
if such it may now be called, has been devoted mainly to the maintenance
of the status quo. At a time, therefore, when the disturbing and destruc-
111. Cf. United States v. E. C. Knight & Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895), Hopkins v. United
States, 171 U. S. 578 (1898), and Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 604 (1898), giving
a restricted interpretation to the Sherman Anti-Trust Law which the Court modified In
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911); and Child Labor Cases, supra note
106. For discussion of these and other cases, see Stern, That Commerce Which Affects More
States than One (1934) 47 HARv. L. Rav. 1350 ff.
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five elements of industrial life require much greater activity on the part
of the legislative and executive agencies of government the courts assume
a dog-in-the-manger policy of refusal to permit any government to reg-
ulate important phases of social and industrial life. -2
It has indeed come to pass as Justice White warned that "the govern-
ments, state and federal, are bereft by the operation of the Constitution
of the United States of a power which must belong to and somewhere
reside in every civilized government."' 13  When it is realized that by
present constitutional criteria with their judicial gloss, neither Congress
nor the states can fully and effectively regulate traffic, state or inter-
state, neither Congress nor the states can regulate in any thoroughgoing
manner holding companies, pools, and trusts, and neither Congress nor
the states can regulate so as to remove conditions deemed generally un-
desirable and unfair in relation to child labor, unemployment, wages,
hours of labor, or prices, the form of political paralysis prescribed by
means of the American doctrine of limited government as applied by the
courts, becomes apparent. 14 The decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States sustaining state emergency acts in the Minnesota
Moratorium Case"' and the New York Milk Control Case11 by 5-to-4
decisions, though indicating a trend toward more liberal criteria for the
consideration of legislative acts, have been so interpreted as to affect but
little the scope of the field of public regulation.
Judicial review of acts of Congress as well as acts of the states has
tended to encourage a form of judicial legislation which has as its chief
objective the closing of some of the avenues of public control except so
far as judicial decisions may be reversed by the cumbersome process of
constitutional amendments. It has made of the Supreme Court one of
the foremost legislative agencies of the nation. But its legislative activi-
ties are exercised for the most part in a negative and destructive man-
112. "What we face now, at numerous and critical points," says Dean Garrison, "i
the question, not how governmental functions shall be shared, but whether in subtAance
we shall govern at all," in The Constitution and the Futzure (Jan. 29, 1936) NXw Rrumuuc
328.
113. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 15, 32 (1903).
114. "It has never been supposed, since the adoption of the Constitution," said Chief
Justice Taft, "that the business of the butcher, or the baker, the tailor or the wood chopper,
the mining operator or the miner was clothed with such a public interest that the price of
his product or his wages could be fixed by state regulation." Wolff Packing Co. v. In-
dustrial Court, 262 U. S. 522, 537 (1923). See also decisions condemning other state regula-
tory acts-Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U. S. 1 (1926) (regulating prices for
buyers of cream); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U. S. 235 (1927) (prescribing prices
for sale of gasoline); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262 (1932) (controlling
the manufacture and sale of ice).
115. Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934).
116. Nebbia v. New York- 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
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ner."' And judicial legislation in the field of constitutional law is subject
to the same infirmities which characterized this phase of the court's
work in the growth of the common law. Though the justices are in-
fluenced by the beliefs and feelings of the time, they are more likely
to be guided by the professional habits and ways of thinking of the
groups with which they normally associate. Furthermore they are more
likely to be interested in the logic and symmetry of the law than in the
objects and policies to be attained through the law.118 It is rather to be
expected that the Justices would not look favorably upon new legislative
ventures and would seek to find limits to governmental powers other than
those expressly defined in the Constitution.
Judges have frequently pointed out, as did Chancellor Kent, that
justices may decide what is just and expedient and then seek the prece-
dents to sustain their action. This observation is peculiarly applicable
to certain phases of constitutional interpretation. It is apparent, both
from the language of the Court and from its general attitude, that an
unfavorable judgment was formed regarding recent acts of Congress
and that that reasoning was then adopted which would sanction the
view formed. The Court appears to have ignored its own well-recog-
nized attitude in interpreting the Constitution as a document designed
to establish "a government for a nation." No more discouraging and
disheartening situation could be imagined than the present demoraliza-
tion of federal administration due to the lack of agreement, understand-
ing and co~peration between the legislative and executive departments
of the government and the judiciary.
It may be taken for granted that under the stress of circumstances
mistakes and misjudgments were made both in the enactment of legis-
lation and in its administration. But such mistakes as were made were
not due to the lack of understanding of the meaning and significance
of the Constitution. Eminent authorities on constitutional law could
find ample justification for the acts passed, both in the express language
of the document and in its amplification by judicial construction. The
present disastrous results of judicial review of legislation in the Ameri-
can federal system can lead to only one conclusion, namely, that if a
117. "To annul a law," said Professor Hans Kelsen, "is to establish a general norm;
for the abolition of a law has" Zthe same) "character of generality as to make it, being, so to
speak, only the making with negative action-hence a phase of the legislative function. A
court ... which has the power to annul laws is consequently an organ of legislative power,"
La garantie juridictionnelle de la constitution (1928) 45 RnvuE Dt DROIT PUBLIC 197. For
certain modifications in the practice and procedure relating to judicial review, based on the
notion that this function of the courts is essentially legislative in character, see Grant,
Judicial Review under the Austrian Constitution of 1920 (1934) 28 Am. Pot. Se. Rny,
670 ff.
118. DiCEy, LEprUs o THE RanArox BETWEEN LAW AND PuBaIc OPNIou ix Ezio-
LAND DURING HE Nn'mNTETH CWrTuar (1905) 361.
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government adequate to meet the exigencies of modern industrial so-
ciety is desired, the legislative and executive departments of the gov-
ernment must be given authority to deal with emergencies and to carry
out the will of the people." 9
V
If interstate commerce is limited in accordance with the criteria an-
nounced by the Court in the Railroad Retirement and N.R.A. Cases, and
the taxing and spending powers of Congress are confined within the
restrictions imposed by the A.A.A. decision, a broad interpretation of
federal authority has definitely been rejected and the Constitution has
become an instrument unsuited to the economic and social conditions of
modem life. "Powers not granted are prohibited. None to regulate
agricultural production is given," maintained Justice Roberts in the
A.A.A. Case, "and therefore legislation by Congress for that purpose is
forbidden."'2 0 Thus the word "expressly" is added to the language of
the Tenth Amendment, the word which Chief Justice Marshall insisted
was not inserted in the amendment when he declined to adopt the views
of Jefferson and approved instead the dictum of Hamilton in the follow-
ing words, quoted in Justice Stone's dissenting opinion:
"Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitu-
tion and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit
of the Constitution, are constitutional."' 21
After more than a century of liberal construction, following Alexander
Hamilton's formula as developed by Chief Justice Marshall and his
successors, with so few exceptions as not seriously to check the main
trend of constitutional interpretation, the government of the United
States is, by a series of Court decisions, held to be confined within limits
similar to those advocated by Thomas Jefferson. Thus, it is demanded
that we live within the confines of the Constitution, both as placed
there by express language and as implied by judicial construction, until
it can be duly amended, regardless of the effect upon the nation. With
such a restrictive interpretation, however, it must be remembered that
Thomas Jefferson favored frequent amendments to the Constitution and
a total revision, at least for each generation. A constitution which can-
119. "No great nation," asserts Harold J. Laski, "with problems to solve commensurate
-with its greatness will submit the control of its policy to a majority of nine men who can
not be called to account for their actions. Where fundamental disharmony of this hind
persists, the time has come for constitutional revision." In review of Corm.m.'s Tim Tw-
LIGHT OF T SIPEaI CoURT (1935) 44 YArx L. J. 1126.
120. Majority opinion in United States v. Butler, 56 Sup. Ct. 320 (1936).
121. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (U. S. 1816). See Tim Wonns or
AcAwDr.R EHaumrox (Lodge ed. 1885-S6) 458.
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not be expanded by interpretation or readily amended to meet the con-
ditions of a modern economic and industrial society must either be dis-
carded or in many respects subjected to rather drastic revision.
The modernized version of the Jefferson-Madison doctrine to which
the Supreme Court appears now to be committed means that there can
be no consistent national planning along either economic or political
lines, that progress in the carrying out of national policies can only be
by fits and starts, that periods of forward movement will be followed by
periods of political paralysis when the wheels of government must stand
still while new paths to meet the wishes of our legal conservators are
being formulated. Such a condition points to the conclusion that either
the present Constitution must be revised so that adequate powers may be
granted to the federal government to deal with those conditions for which
the states are separately incompetent and some of the shackles which
now fetter state action must be removed, or steps must be taken to secure
a form of national legislative supremacy.
There is no doubt that the time has come to give serious consideration
to the calling of a Constitutional Convention-though it be a long de-
ferred one, when viewed according to the Jeffersonian standard. All who
desire to see a system of government adequately organized to cope with
the complex problems of modern life must look forward to the early
calling of a National Constitutional Convention.122
For the most part excepting certain obsolete sections the present pro-
visions of the Constitution could be retained, with special efforts, how-
ever, to remove some of the checks and balances which were deliberately
inserted in the Constitution to prevent free and effective action. More
definite arrangements should be provided for the co6peration of the
legislative and executive departments. Significant changes are necessary
along the line of the increase of federal powers. Authority should be
given to the federal government to regulate commerce, industry and busi-
ness, both state and interstate, so far as is necessary to carry out national
policies. The federal government should be given authority to secure
uniform control over crime and criminal procedure, as well as authority
to develop standards and secure uniformity in the field of social and
economic legislation. Ways should be devised also for the extension of
regional planning, both in the organization and administration of govern-
ment. It is significant to note that the proposal to increase the powers
of the federal government accords with the constitutional provisions and
the practice of other federal systems of government.
123
122. In TH Nam FOR CONSTiTUTIONAL Ru'oaa (1935), Professor W. Y. Elliot presents
cogent arguments for thorough constitutional revision with interesting and suggestive pro-
posals for consideration by such a convention.
123. Authority is granted to the national government of Argentina to enact civil, com.
mecial, penal and mining codes and "to provide for all that conduces to the prosperity of
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Primary consideration will need to be given to the removal of the
checks and the paralysis of political activity resulting from the review
of legislative acts. To readjust the arrangements now generally followed
in the exercise of this authority, it will be necessary to distinguish three
types of judicial review. First, there is a type which relates to the
requirement that the proper procedure be followed in the enactment
of laws, as for example, that a measure be approved by both houses,
and that no irregularity vitiate the process of its consideration and en-
actment. This type of judicial review is recognized in most countries
having written constitutions. Even where legislative supremacy pre-
vails, as in France and Belgium, the courts are conceded to have the
authority to interfere to correct procedural irregularities.
Second, there is a type of jurisdictional review. 124  This type of
review, so far as legislative acts are concerned, is an important phase
of the government in all federal systems. Some umpire must be au-
thorized to adjudicate the conflicts that may arise when the federal or
local agencies interfere with the rights and functions of each other.Y2
It has been customary to confer upon the courts this umpire function.
Whenever the provisions of the constitutions are relatively clear and
the powers have been expressly and definitely divided between the
national and local agencies, this jurisdictional type of review involves
the courts in few controversies. The main purpose in constitutional re-
vision, so far as this type of review is concerned, should be to make the
division of powers between federal and local agencies as clear and exact
as possible and to avoid such phrases as due process of law or equal
the country, to the advancement and welfare of all the provinces, and to the advancement
and enlightenment of the people." Art. 67, §§ 11 and 16.
The Parliament of Australia has power "to make laws for the peace, and good government
of the Commonwealth"; to grant bounties on the production or e.po-t of goods; to
regulate foreign corporations and trading or financial corporations; and to enact laws re-
lating to matrimonial causes, invalid and old-age pensions and conciliation and arbitration.
Art. 51.
The Dominion government in Canada is granted authority "to make laws for the peace,
order and good government of Canada in relation to all matters not coming within the
classes of subjects by this act assigned e.xclusively to the legislatures of the provinces," alzo
to enact laws relating to criminal law and marriage and divorce. Art. 91.
The federal government of Switzerland has authority to enact regulations in regard to the
exercise of trade and manufactures as well as with respect to the criminal law. A rts. 31
and 64.
124. It is not within the scope of this article to deal with this phase of the work of
the Supreme Court wherein some of its most important and effective work has been ac-
complished.
125. For a defense of the application of the rule of federal legislative supremacy in a
federal system of government, consult WuxLm E. RApp.o, Lu coN nmO: r D L, COSNrnL-
TION-qALITE DES LIoS :eDERA-LES PAR LR J-UGES ATX llTATS-U-IN- ET En SUISSE (Bale, 1934);
and for a brief analysis of judicial review of legislation in Canada and Australia, se
T u A.rzascse Docm nr or JumImlcA SUrrPMCYZ (2d ed. 1932) 598, 578.
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protection of the laws which encourage the judges to engage in objec-
tionable forms of legislation. This form of review of legislation operates
to better advantage where, as in Switzerland, to the corrective of con-
stitutional amendments there is added legislative authority to intervene
when the public necessity or welfare requires, or where, as in Canada
and Australia, vague and indefinite phrases are to a greater degree than
in the United States omitted from the Constitution.
The third type of review is one in which the written fundamental law
is interpreted or understood through vague, general terms such as due
process of law and equal protection of the laws to give authority to the
courts to check substantive acts of legislation and administration, thereby
subjecting co6rdinate branches of the same government to judicial sur-
veillance. It is the latter form of judicial review of legislation which
was developed in the United States largely since 1885, and which
has rendered the authority wielded by the courts the potent weapon that
it is to protect vested interests. In any effort to change the existing
system of review of legislation it will be necessary to recognize and treat
somewhat differently the three types of judicial review as above de-
scribed. Judging by the standards of effective and useful performance
in the public interest, it appears that type one may well remain un-
changed, type two will need to be retained with considerably limited
scope for its application, and type three ought to be discontinued, or, if
retained, should be made subject to reversal by subsequent legislative
enactments, either by an ordinary majority vote or a two-thirds vote as
in the case of the Presidential veto. And a method of amendment of the
Constitution should be adopted which would come nearer to rendering
effective the prevailing sentiment of the nation.
If such a convention were called and a new Constitution prepared, it
would not be necessary to present an entirely new document to the
voters for consideration. The amendments could be presented and voted
upon separately so that in case of a disapproval of certain amendments
the electors would not thereby register disapproval of the entire docu-
ment. But desirable as these and other changes in the Constitution may
be, it is not likely that a thorough revision of the Constitution will be
made for some time to come. Has not the time come, however, to begin
to consider and to prepare for the calling of such a Convention?
It is frequently contended that, when the justices interpret the Con-
stitution so as to place undue limits on the authority of the federal
government or of the states, the normal and expedient way to meet the
situation is to take steps to amend the Constitution. But most of the
proposals concerning the increase in federal powers can rather readily
be defeated by the minority of the states which may not be interested
or may find it to their advantage to oppose federal regulation. The
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failure to approve the Child Labor Amendment is indicative of the
result which may be expected in the effort to enlarge federal authority
through constitutional amendments. Nevertheless, sentiment is being
crystallized in the direction of a few major amendments to remedy some
serious defects in the distribution of powers between the federal and
state governnients as now interpreted by the courts..
The most important amendments which are being considered relate
to the due process of law, the commerce, and the general welfare clauses
of the Constitution. As a basis for discussion Dean Garrison of the
Law School of the University of Wisconsin has proposed an amend-
ment which provides that "Congress shall have power to promote the
economic welfare of the United States by such laws as in its judgment
are appropriate, and to delegate such a power in whole or in part to the
states. Existing state powers are not affected by this article, except as
Congress may occupy a particular field. ' 12  Representative Wood, on
behalf of various groups, presented for the consideration of Congress
an amendment giving Congress power to enact uniform laws to regulate
commerce, business, industry, finance, banking, insurance, manufactures,
transportation, agriculture and the production of natural resources; 1'
and another, proposed by Senator Costigan, is designed to give Congress
authority to regulate prices, wages, hours of labor and unfair practices
which affect the general welfare of the United States."-'
It is also proposed to take steps to authorize the federal government
to enact and administer such measures as are in the interest of the gen-
eral welfare. Bringing to public attention again a controversy agitated
by constitutional lawyers for decades after the adoption of the Constitu-
tion, members of Congress contend that authority to pass laws to pre-
serve and promote the general welfare was intended to be given to Con-.
gress in the first clause of Article 1, sec. 8, of the Constitution. Claiming
that the intent of the Constitution was to confer this power, it is be-
lieved that Congress should assert its authority and that greater powers
may thus be exercised by the federal government without a constitutional
amendment.1 9 The language of the majority of the Court in the A.A.A.
Case would seem to imply, however, that the Court as at present con-
stituted proposes to determine when legislative acts properly come
126. (Jan. 29, 1936) NEw RI PuB.c, 329.
127. H. J. REs. No. 323, 74th Cong., 1st sL-s., June 12, 1935.
128. Resolution by Senator Costigan, S. 3. Rrs. No. 3, 74th Cong., 1st se:z3., Jan. 3, 1935.
129. Cf. Nuilification of Acts of Congress, remarks of David J. Lewis in House of
Representatives, 79 Co-;G. Rac. 13903 (1935), and L.%v;Wso:-, Tim Grz:xu. Wr_'An CLwa.:




within the scope of the general welfare and that only a constitutional
amendment can accomplish the end desired.
In addition to the extreme difficulty of focusing public sentiment on
any one of these proposals sufficiently to secure its adoption under the
present system of minority control, a great difficulty appears in that,
as long as the courts, applying the limitations of the Tenth Amendment
and of the due process clause, retain authority to interpret these phrases
and to declare acts of Congress void on the basis of these provisions,
relatively little would be gained by the extraordinary effort and expense
involved to secure the adoption of such amendments. The Canadian
Constitution, for example, authorized the Dominion government to
legislate for the good government of Canada or in the interest *of the
general welfare. The Canadian courts and the Privy Council, however,
have interpreted this language so as to limit it to emergency conditions
only, thereby emasculating the general welfare clause deliberately
adopted to secure a type of central control lacking in the federal system
of the United States. As long as the courts retain their present power
of review of legislative acts, the attempts which are being made to amend
the Constitution will, even if the necessary approval of Congress and
the requisite number of states may be secured, prove to be only partial
and ineffective expedients to secure more adequate control by the nation
over its economic and social life.
For the time being, the only feasible methods, short of a thorough
revision of the Constitution by means of a national constitutional con-
vention--of enlarging the powers of the federal government to correspond
to the nationalistic trends of the time along social and economic lines-
are either to bring such irresistible pressure to bear on the judges that
they will find reasons to approve rather than to condemn legislation
enacted for the public interest or the general welfare, or to place in-
superable procedural obstacles in the way of the review of acts of Con-
gress by the courts. To a considerable degree the carrying out of both
of these methods belongs primarily to Congress and the President.
The recent decisions by the Supreme Court have brought a renewed
interest in proposals to check the authority of the federal courts to review
acts of Congress and to limit their jurisdiction both by legislative acts
and constitutional amendments. These proposals include resolutions
presented in Congress authorizing the Supreme Court to render advisory
opinions, removing from the federal courts all authority to pass on the
validity of acts of Congress, confining the review to acts to the Supreme
Court, requiring more than a majority of the Court in passing on the
validity of legislative acts, and restricting the jurisdiction of the federal
courts so far as the consideration of the validity of legislative acts is
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concerned.130 A resolution proposed by Senator Norris provides that
all judgments relating to the invalidity of laws because of conflicts with
provisions of the Constitution must be concurred in by two-thirds of the
members of the Court, and also that all such actions must be commenced
within sLx months after the enactment.13 1 Even if it were within the
range of possibility to enact laws or constitutional amendments to
authorize the Supreme Court to render advisory opinions or to require
a concurrence of at least two-thirds of the members of the court to de-
clare a law void, only temporary and rather intermittent relief might be
afforded from the decisions considered objectionable. But these and
other constitutional amendments limiting the jurisdiction or procedure
of the Supreme Court in dealing with questions relating to the validity
of acts of Congress are not considered within the realm of probability.
Proposals are under consideration by Congress to restrict the jurisdic-
tion of the inferior federal courts so far as the consideration of the
validity of legislative acts is concerned and also to limit the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court along similar lines. Such a limitation
of jurisdiction is predicated upon the doctrine that the control over the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is completely in the hands of
Congress, and that according to the Constitution only such cases shall
be appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States from the lower
federal courts or from the state courts as Congress may from time to
time ordain and direct.
It has been held from the time of the adoption of the Constitution
that the inferior federal courts are dependent upon Congress for their
existence and the powers they exercise. Congress has not hesitated to
abolish inferior federal courts or to limit their jurisdiction. These courts
have been prohibited from issuing injunctions relating to the assessment
or the collection of a federal tax, though this limitation is proving in-
effective and is now being vigorously contested; they have been deprived
of jurisdiction under certain conditions to restrain the enforcement of
orders of state utility commissions; and they have been prohibited, except
through a specially constituted court of three judges, from enjoining
actions of the Interstate Commerce Commission or of state officers
claimed to be in violation of the federal Constitution. Speaking of the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, Justice Sutherland commented as
follows:
"Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is derived directly from
the Constitution. Every other court created by the general government
derives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress. That body
,may give, withhold, or restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion, provided
130. See H. J. REs. Nos. 277, 317, 374, 74th Cong., 1st ss. (1934-35).
131. S. J. RES. No. 149, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., June 17, 1936.
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it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the Constitution. The
Constitution simply gives to the inferior courts the capacity to takejurisdiction in the enumerated cases, but it requires an act of Congress to
confer it. And the jurisdiction, having been conferred, may, at the will
of Congress, be taken away in whole or in part; and, if withdrawn with-
out a saving clause, all pending cases, though cognizable when commenced,
must fall."' 3 2
Concerning the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, Chief
Justice Ellsworth said in 1796: "If Congress has provided no rule to
regulate our proceedings, we cannot expect an appellate jurisdiction; and
if the rule is provided, we cannot depart from it."'' a3 This doctrine,
reiterated a number of times, was reaffirmed in 1893 when it was an-
nounced that "this Court, therefore, as it has always held, can exercise
no appellate jurisdiction, except in cases, and in the manner and form,
defined and prescribed by Congress.' 4
Congress may without question regulate and limit the jurisdiction of
the inferior federal courts and also may place restrictions upon the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Carrying this doctrine to
its logical conclusion, it would seem to follow that Congress may except
from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts the authority to review
acts of Congress in so far as their validity or constitutionality is con-
cerned and may also prevent appeal to the Supreme Court of such cases
either from the lower federal courts or from the state courts. Congress
accomplished this result in 1868 when it repealed a law authorizing
appeals to the Supreme Court in order to prevent that tribunal from
passing on the validity of certain Reconstruction Acts. As a result, the
Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction in a case presented to it.185
It is, of course, possible that such a statute may be held void by the
Supreme Court as an interference with the inherent powers of a court
and with what is deemed as the necessary function of courts as estab-
lished by Congress under the grant of authority to the judiciary by the
Constitution. Indeed, it is now rather generally assumed that the
requirements of due process of law, largely developed by judicial con-
struction, would prevent the adoption of the proposed restrictions upon
the exercise of judicial powers.136 Decisions by the Supreme Court to
132. Kline v. Burke Construction Company, 260 U. S. 226, 234 (1922).
133. Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 Dall. 321, 327 (U. S. 1796).
134. American Construction Company v. Jacksonville etc. Railway Company, 147 U. S.
372, 378 (1893). See Duncan v. The "Francis Wright," 105 U. S. 381, 386 (1881), in which
it was noted that "authority to limit the jurisdiction necessarily carries with it authority
to limit the use of the juirisdiction."
135. Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506 (U. S. 1868).
136. See reasoning of Chief Justice Taft in Truax v. Corrigan 257 U. S. 312 (1921)
(holding void a state act which exempted certain parties from restraint by injunction whilo
leaving others subject to such Irestraint, on the ground that it denied the equal protection of
the laws).
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this effect, however, would run counter to the express language of the
Constitution and it would be difficult to justify a reversal of the long
accepted interpretation of the authority of Congress over the federal
courts. The Supreme Court, may, however, as in the attempt to deny
to the courts authority to issue injunctions, accept the doctrine of Con-
gressional supremacy, but find ways of evading the effect of the statute.0 7
What can be done in the meantime, while public sentiment is in pre-
paration for the adoption of amendments or the calling of a Constitu-
tional Convention? Must the status quo remain without substantial
change during what is apparently a rather long and indefinite period?
The answer to this query need not be wholly discouraging. There are
ways by which the power of the people acting through their authorized
representatives may be rendered effective. In the first place, the
deference to the decisions of courts involving the general attitude of
acceptance of decisions invalidating acts and the refusal to move in
contrary directions is an attitude which has been slowly developed and
which is not expressly sanctioned by the fundamental law. When the
justices choose the wrong road, as they did according to the best in-
formed judgment in the minimum wage case"s and in the application of
the rule of Smythz v. Ames in rate regulation cases, 13 it is possible, as
the states have discovered, to continue to enforce more rational doctrines
with relatively little interference by the federal courts. Neither Con-
gress nor the Executive are obliged to accept the decisions of the courts
as final and conclusive and beyond change so far as the political and
economic effects of the decisions are concerned '-1 0 The judges themselves
insist that tley do not declare acts of Congress invalid; they merely refuse
to apply an act to the case in controversy. If the language is taken
literally that the law remains as a law, its application merely being denied
as between the parties before the court, the final declaration of invalidity
may be a long deferred process. And why may not Congress, argued
Madison, place an interpretation upon the Constitution which the courts
and other departments should respect. In fact, Congress has placed
such interpretations upon the Constitution, some of which have been the
137. See Miller v. Nut Margarine Co., 2S4 U. S. 498 (1932), in which the rule pre2cribad
by RLv. STAr. § 3224 (1878), 26 U. S. C. A. § 154 (1926), prohibiting suits in federal
courts to restrain the assment or collection of a tax was held, Stone and Brandeis, J. J.,
dssenting, not to be an absolute rule and to be inapplicable under "extraordinary and
exceptional circumstances." It was not difficult for federal judges to discover such "extra-
ordinary and exceptional circumstances" for the issuance of injunctions to retrain the
enforcement of the tax provisions of the AAA.
138. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
139. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (1890); Smyth
v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
140. See Jackson's opinion on constitutionality of a national bank, 2 Mnss._cis m
PAPERs or Ti PRasmn-ns (1898) 581; Lincoln's views on Dred Scott Case, Lrncor. a:
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law of the land for many years.14' Conflicting interpretations persisted
in by coordinate departments would necessitate more frequent reference
of crucial constitutional questions of political or economic significance
to the ultimate source of power-the people.
VI
Roger Pinto of the University of Paris in his recent monograph on the
dissenting opinions of the Supreme Court142 contends that judicial review
of legislation of the American type may have been useful and appropriate
for a young and immature nation when the people were unwilling to trust
themselves or their elected representatives. He then raises the query
whether the American people have not grown up and whether they are
not at the present time able to stand upon their own feet instead of
continuing to depend in their economic and political conduct so largely
upon the judgments of a few legal conservators. Cannot the spirit of
uncertainty and distrust that surrounds our processes of legislation and
execution be replaced by one of frank confidence and support even
though we may realize that elected or appointed agents may make mis-
takes and that not all of their experiments may prove successful? May
not the trial and error method which has been so characteristic of the
growth of the common law, as well as of the doctrine of judicial review
of legislation itself, now be applied in the grant to the primary political
agencies-the legislative and executive departments-of a greater degree
of freedom to enact and carry out policies deemed in the public interest?
There are many who, as in the formative period of American political
institutions, desire a governmental system of checks and balances, the
continuance and extension of the aristocracy of the robe, and the
assurance that the property and contract rights will be preserved by
what the Jeffersonian Republicans called the "check" department of the
government. But those who object to the authority wielded by the
courts in the exercise of judicial review usually accept the doctrine of
review of legislative acts as inevitable in the American system of govern-
ment and seek what Professor Lambert calls "palliatives" for the unwise
and reactionary decisions of judgesY.43  Have we not discovered how
weak and inapposite these palliatives are, such as the proposals to remedy
DOUGLAS DEBATES (1895) 29, 30, and First Inaugural Address; contention of Theodore
Roosevelt that "it is the people and not the judges, who are entitled to say what their
Constitution means," from Introduction to RAxsom, MAjOruTy RULa AND Ta Juonclay
(1912) 3.
141. See decision of Congress on the removal power of the President, approved in Myers
v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1925).
142. DES JUGES QUI NE GOUVERNEMENT PAS: OPINIONS DISSIDENTES A LA COUR SUPR9mE
DES iTATS-UNIs (1900-1933) 1934.
143. Cf. LE GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES (1921) c. X.
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the defects of judicial review of legislation by educating the judges in
social and economic affairs, or by requiring more than a majority for the
decision of controversial cases, or by permitting a recall of judges or of
judicial decisions? Has not the time come to recognize frankly that
with all the advantages of judicial review, so far as the acts of coirdinate
branches of government are concerned, and, to a limited degree, for the
review of the acts of subordinate divisions of the federal system in ac-
cordance with vague and indefinite terms, a method was adopted in the
adjustment of legal relations in the United States which leads only to
political paralysis? And has it not become apparent that the adoption
of legislative supremacy will offer the only consistent and permanent
remedy for some of the foremost defects in the administration of federal
government in the United States?
Steps leading in the direction of legislative supremacy would, of course,
have to be taken gradually and with considerable caution so as not to
disrupt too drastically the delicate system of controls which the judges
have gathered unto themselves. But the fears which special interests
have conjured up against the exercise of greater legislative powers, are to
a considerable extent illusory. Legislatures do not normally set about to
destroy existing property or vested rights. They do not interfere with
the court's ordinary interpretation and application of the laws, if the
judiciary does not enter the realm of politics and legislation. Where
the representative system with legislative supremacy prevails, the opera-
tions of government are carried out much the same as they are in
countries with judicial supremacy. It is only when grave political issues
are at stake that questions of political supremacy play a prominent part
in public discussions. And it is with respect to such issues that legisla-
tive supremacy involves a greater degree of freedom in carrying out
policies deemed vital to the public welfare and judicial supremacy is
more likely to be concerned with the preservation of private interests
and the protection of property rights.
It is contended that according to such a view the Constitution would
no longer be the supreme law of the land as provided by its language.
The issue, however, may be more accurately stated as to whether it is a
lawyer's interpretation of the Constitution or the people's interpretation
that is to prevail.' In most foreign countries the rule is adopted that
the guardianship of the constitution belongs to the legislature, and,
subject to a reversal by popular referendum or the election of a new
144. "I contend that the people, in the nature of things must be better judges of vhat
is the preponderant opinion than the courts, and that the courts should not be allowed
to reverse the political philosophy of the people.' Theodore Roosevelt, The Right of the
People to Rule (March 23, 1912) Oumoor 620.
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assembly, the legislature determines the limits of its own authority and
exercises control over the other departments of government. The legis-
lature not only exercises ordinary legislative authority, but is recognized
as possessing constituent powers to a limited extent. Where this rule is
accepted, a written constitution is regarded mainly as a document com-
prising groups of political laws which the political departments are both
by reason of propriety and convenience empowered to interpret, except
when reversed by constitutional amendments. The well recognized
dictum of American Judges that there are certain questions of a
political nature which the courts ought not to undertake to determine,
and which should be settled by the legislative and executive departments
of government, is extended so as to include practically all of the pro-
visions of the Constitution. The prescriptions of the Constitution, not
being considered laws in the ordinary sense as understood by judges in
interpreting and applying their provisions, cannot form the basis of a
contention or case before a court. A controversy regarding the mean-
ing of a constitutional provision is simply not a justiciable controversy.
The basic hypotheses, therefore, on which the American constitutional
structure is founded, that constitutions are laws in the ordinary signi-
ficance of that term, and that a case or controversy involving an alleged
conflict between a constitutional provision and a statute is necessarily
subject to judicial cognizance, are in those other countries repudiated
as legally unsound and politically impracticable. 4 The courts in all
but a few foreign countries are either denied the authority to review
legislative acts or, when such authority is conceded as belonging to the
courts, it is so seldom exercised as to have relatively slight effect upon
the practical operation of the government.
In a prophetic vein Richard Henry Lee, in arguing against the adop-
tion of the federal Constitution, objected to the amending clause on the
grounds that it would make changes extremely difficult. Possibly fore-
seeing the interpretation of the Constitution by an appointive judiciary,
he made the following prediction:
"While power is in the hands of the people, or democratic part of the
community, more especially as at present, it is easy, according to the gen-
eral course of human affairs, for the few influential men in the com-
munity, to obtain conventions, alterations in government, and to persuade
the common people that they may change for the better, and to get from
them a part of the power: But when power is once transferred from the
many to the few, all changes become extremely difficult; the government,
in this case, being beneficial to the few, they will be exceedingly artful
and adroit in preventing any measures which may lead to a change; and
145. Cf. Some Phases of the Theory and Practice of Judicial Review of Legislation it;
Foreign Countries (1930) 24 Am. Po.. Si. REv. 583.
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nothing will produce it, but great exertions and severe struggles on the
part of the common people. Every man of reflection must see, that the
change now proposed, is a transfer of power from the many to the few,
and the probability is, the artful and ever active aristocracy, will prevent
all peaceful measures for changes, unless when they shall discover some
favorable moment to increase their own influenceY1"0
And it is obvious that, the change of base to which Lee referred having
been made, the way toward a restoration of the powers of the people ap-
pears to be lined with innumerable obstructions.
But urgent as is the need for constitutional reform along many lines
and difficult as it appears to remove the judges from their intrenched
position of supremacy in the American federal system, the issue of
judicial review of legislation must be resolved in favor of the establish-
ment of popular control over major political issues and of the removal
from judicial control of controversies regarding the public powers of
government; and this issue must be settled before any effective constitu-
tional reform along other essential lines can be accomplished. The de-
cisions of the Supreme Court in the "Hot Oil," Railroad Pension, N.R. A.,
and A.A.A. Cases, and the threat of a national calamity by a possible
adverse decision in the Gold Clause Cases as well as the disastrous results
which may follow from impending decisions of scarcely less significance,
raise more insistently than at any other time in the nation's history the
question as to the desirability of the present system of judicial review
of legislation. Among the various devices to check judicial review of
legislation and to permit public sentiment to express itself more freely,
the one which had the greatest appeal at the time President Theodore
Roosevelt made judicial review one of the major political issues, was the
plan of securing liberal minded judges upon the bench. The inadequacy
of such a plan is apparent. We are thus brought face to face with the
real challenge to American statesmen of the twentieth century, namely,
whether we shall take steps to overcome the extreme rigidity of constitu-
tional law by adopting a series of constitutional amendments which will
carry out the purpose and intent of the constitutional development of
more than a century to make the United States in reality a nation, and
whether we shall begin an agitation in favor of a constitutional conven-
tion with the object of securing a thorough revision of the federal funda-
mental law. In the meantime, the co6rdinate branches of the government
may be prevailed upon to exercise some of the undoubted authority which
they possess under the Constitution to foster and preserve government
by the people rather than to accept a judicial supremacy developed
largely through judicial construction often prompted by the urgent de-
146. From Letters of a Federal Farmer (1930) in FoRa, PA pnxr.LEs o! TM Co!;srru-
To (18S8) 317, 318.
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mands of interested groups and applied in such a way as to protect such
groups.
The statesmen of 1787 to 1789 faced the issue and did not hesitate
when necessary, to resort to revolutionary methods to change the funda-
mental law to meet the conditions of the time. Similarly, the statesmen
of 1861 to 1865 refused to permit the Constitution to stand as a barrier
in the way of carrying out the well matured sentiment and policies of the
nation. Will the statesmen of the twentieth Century fail to take the
necessary steps to adjust their government to the prevailing conditions
of economic and political life? Will national policies and progress be
confined permanently within the express restrictions and the judge-made
limits of a written Constitution prepared essentially to suit eighteenth
century conditions, or will both the Constitution and its judicial gloss be
changed, as Jefferson and Lincoln insisted they should, to accord with
the progress of the life of the people?
